Juno Cash: Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash with Mandatory Privacy and Egalitarian Mining

The Juno Cash Project
Version 1.0
October 2025

Abstract

The advent of Bitcoin demonstrated the technical feasibility of decentralized electronic cash systems, yet subsequent implementations have revealed fundamental limitations in privacy, accessibility, and stability. Transparent ledgers enable comprehensive surveillance of all economic activity, specialized mining hardware concentrates network control in the hands of few participants, and short difficulty adjustment windows create excessive block time variance that undermines system predictability.

We present Juno Cash, a cryptocurrency protocol that addresses these limitations through three principal innovations. First, we enforce mandatory privacy by restricting all user transactions to Zcash's Orchard shielded pool, encrypting all addresses and amounts while revealing only transaction fees for market coordination and aggregate supply for auditability through the valueBalance mechanism. Second, we employ RandomX proof-of-work to resist Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) dominance and promote broad participation using commodity hardware. Third, we optimize consensus parameters with faster block intervals and an extended difficulty adjustment window, substantially reducing difficulty variance while improving transaction confirmation speed.

Through mathematical analysis of network propagation delays, difficulty retargeting dynamics, and emission schedule economics, we demonstrate that these design choices create a practical system for censorship-resistant electronic cash. The protocol launches with a precisely controlled emission schedule targeting 21 million coin maximum supply, with zero premine and zero founders' reward, ensuring equitable distribution from genesis. We discuss security implications, privacy guarantees, and economic trade-offs, comparing our approach to existing systems including Bitcoin, Zcash, and Monero.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and Motivation

Bitcoin's 2008 introduction by Nakamoto [1] demonstrated that electronic cash could function without trusted intermediaries. However, Bitcoin's transparent ledger design creates a permanent public record of all transactions, enabling comprehensive surveillance and undermining fungibility through transaction graph analysis [2]. While this transparency serves auditability goals, it fundamentally contradicts the privacy expectations users have for monetary systems.

Subsequent privacy-focused cryptocurrencies have attempted to address these concerns through various cryptographic techniques. Monero employs ring signatures and stealth addresses [3], while Zcash introduced zero-knowledge proofs to enable selective disclosure [4]. However, Zcash's optional privacy model has proven insufficient in practice. As of 2024, less than 10% of ZEC supply resides in shielded pools, severely limiting the anonymity set and creating a two-tier system where shielded transactions are marked as exceptional rather than normal [**?**].

Simultaneously, the mining landscape has evolved toward increasing centralization. Bitcoin's SHA-256 and Zcash's Equihash algorithms are amenable to ASIC implementation, resulting in hashrate concentration among industrial operations with access to specialized hardware and

cheap electricity [6]. This concentration poses risks to censorship resistance and creates barriers to entry for ordinary users.

1.2 Contributions

This paper presents Juno Cash, a cryptocurrency protocol designed to restore the original vision of peer-to-peer electronic cash through mandatory privacy, egalitarian mining, and optimized network stability. Our principal contributions are:

Mandatory Privacy Architecture: We eliminate transparent addresses for all circulating coins, mandating that all value in circulation exists in Zcash's Orchard shielded pool [7]. This maximizes the anonymity set while maintaining supply auditability.

Egalitarian Proof-of-Work: We employ RandomX [8], a memory-hard algorithm optimized for CPU execution that resists ASIC implementation. This design choice prioritizes decentralization and accessibility over pure cost-of-attack maximization.

Optimized Consensus Parameters: We reduce block time from Zcash's 75 seconds to 60 seconds while extending the difficulty adjustment window from 17 blocks to 100 blocks. Through mathematical analysis, we demonstrate that this achieves 58.8% reduction in difficulty variance while maintaining acceptable orphan rates.

Bitcoin-Aligned Emission: We implement a disciplined emission schedule targeting approximately 21 million JUNO maximum supply with 4-year halving intervals, zero premine, and zero developers' tax. All emission goes 100% to miners, ensuring equitable distribution and long-term economic predictability aligned with Bitcoin's proven model.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes proof-of-work algorithm selection and ASIC resistance. Section 3 examines block time optimization and network propagation dynamics. Section 4 presents difficulty retargeting analysis and variance reduction. Section 5 details the emission schedule and monetary policy. Section 6 describes the mandatory privacy architecture. Section 7 addresses supply auditability and fee market design through the valueBalance mechanism. Section 8 provides security analysis. Section 9 discusses the threat model and regulatory considerations. Section 10 analyzes economic implications. Section 11 compares our approach to existing systems. Section 12 concludes.

2 Proof-of-Work Algorithm Selection

2.1 The ASIC Centralization Problem

Proof-of-work provides Sybil resistance in permissionless networks by requiring computational expenditure for block production [9]. However, the choice of hash function profoundly impacts mining decentralization. Bitcoin's SHA-256 is highly parallelizable and requires minimal memory, making it amenable to efficient ASIC implementation. Modern Bitcoin ASICs achieve performance ratios exceeding 1000:1 compared to commodity CPUs, effectively excluding non-specialized hardware from meaningful participation [10].

This specialization creates several problematic dynamics. First, ASIC manufacturing requires advanced semiconductor fabrication capabilities, concentrating control among a small number of manufacturers. Second, the high capital requirements for competitive mining operations create barriers to entry, leading to hashrate concentration in industrial facilities. Third, the geographic concentration of mining operations in regions with favorable electricity costs introduces systemic risks including regulatory capture and infrastructure targeting.

Zcash's Equihash algorithm was initially designed to resist ASIC implementation through memory-hardness, requiring 2016 bits of state per hash operation [11]. However, ASICs for Equihash were successfully developed by 2018, demonstrating that memory-hard algorithms based on fixed access patterns remain vulnerable to specialized hardware optimization [12].

2.2 RandomX: Memory-Hard CPU-Optimized Mining

RandomX, developed by the Monero community, represents a more aggressive approach to ASIC resistance through dynamic program execution [8]. The algorithm operates by generating pseudo-random programs that execute on a virtual machine, performing operations drawn from the standard CPU instruction set including integer arithmetic, floating-point operations, and conditional branching. Critically, the algorithm requires random access to a 2+ GB dataset, making memory bandwidth a primary performance bottleneck.

The security properties of RandomX derive from the observation that modern CPUs represent highly optimized implementations of general-purpose computation. Any ASIC implementation must recreate this functionality while providing sufficient memory bandwidth, offering limited efficiency gains compared to commodity hardware. Empirical testing suggests that optimized ASIC implementations might achieve at most 2-5× efficiency improvements over high-end CPUs, compared to 1000×+ ratios for SHA-256 [8].

2.3 Security Trade-offs and Decentralization

Critics of CPU-friendly algorithms argue that they reduce the cost of attack since commodity hardware can be rented from cloud providers [13]. This concern merits examination. Let C_h denote the cost per unit hashrate for honest mining and C_a denote the cost per unit hashrate for an attacker. The security ratio R is:

$$R = \frac{C_a}{C_h} \tag{1}$$

For ASIC-dominated networks, $R \approx 1$ since both honest miners and attackers must acquire specialized hardware at similar costs. For CPU-friendly networks, cloud rental introduces potential cost asymmetries. However, this analysis conflates relative and absolute security.

The absolute security S of a network can be expressed as the total cost to acquire 51% of network hashrate:

$$S = 0.51 \times H \times C_a \tag{2}$$

where H is total network hashrate. While CPU-friendly algorithms may reduce C_a, they dramatically increase H through broader participation, potentially yielding equivalent or superior absolute security. Moreover, decentralization provides security benefits beyond pure cost-of-attack, including increased censorship resistance through geographic distribution and reduced coordination costs for defending against attacks through community participation.

While C_{cloud} may be low, H_{total} in CPU-mining networks can be orders of magnitude higher than ASIC networks due to broader participation. A RandomX network with 1 million CPU miners each contributing 10 KH/s achieves 10 GH/s total hashrate. Attacking this requires controlling 5.1 GH/s or approximately 510,000 high-end CPUs.

We acknowledge that CPU-friendly proof-of-work may reduce the absolute cost of attack compared to ASIC-dominated systems, as commodity hardware can be rented from cloud providers or assembled from consumer devices. This represents a conscious trade-off: we accept potentially lower absolute attack costs in exchange for dramatically improved decentralization, lower barriers to entry, greater geographic distribution, and enhanced censorship resistance. Real-world threats to cryptocurrency systems often involve regulatory pressure, manufacturer collusion, or infrastructure targeting rather than pure economic attacks. The decentralization benefits of CPU mining provide resilience against these non-economic threat vectors.

3 Block Time Optimization

3.1 Network Propagation and Orphan Probability

Block time selection involves fundamental trade-offs between confirmation latency and network efficiency. Shorter block times provide faster transaction confirmation but increase the probability of orphaned blocks due to network propagation delays. When a miner discovers a valid block, it must propagate across the peer-to-peer network before another miner discovers a competing block at the same height.

Following the analysis of Decker and Wattenhofer [14], the orphan probability can be modeled as:

$$P_{\text{orphan}} \approx 1 - e^{-d/T_b} \tag{3}$$

where d is the mean network propagation delay and T_b is the target block time. For small ratios where $d/T_b \ll 1$, this simplifies to:

$$P_{\text{orphan}} \approx \frac{d}{T_b} \tag{4}$$

Empirical measurements of Bitcoin network propagation suggest mean delays ranging from 1-4 seconds depending on block size and network conditions [15]. Modern improvements including compact block relay and optimized peer-to-peer protocols have reduced these delays substantially compared to early cryptocurrency implementations.

3.2 Comparative Analysis: Zcash vs Juno

Zcash employs a 75-second block time, representing a conservative choice balancing confirmation speed with orphan minimization. We propose reducing this to 60 seconds in Juno. Figure 1 illustrates orphan probability as a function of propagation delay for both systems.



Figure 1: Orphan probability as a function of network propagation delay for Zcash (75s blocks) and Juno (60s blocks). At typical propagation delays of 2 seconds, Juno experiences only a 0.66 percentage point increase in orphan rate while providing 20% faster confirmation.

For $d = 2$ seconds (typical case), we observe:

- Zcash: $P_{\text{orphan}} \approx 2/75 = 2.67\%$
- Juno: $P_{\text{orphan}} \approx 2/60 = 3.33\%$

The absolute increase of 0.66 percentage points represents acceptable waste given the 20% reduction in confirmation latency. Even under adverse conditions with $d = 4$ seconds, Juno maintains $P_{\text{orphan}} < 7\%$.

3.3 User Experience Implications

Transaction confirmation time follows an exponential distribution with mean equal to the block time. The probability $P(t)$ that a transaction remains unconfirmed after time t is:

$$P(t) = e^{-t/T_b} \tag{5}$$

For one confirmation with 95% confidence ($P(t) = 0.05$):

- Zcash (75s): $t \approx 225$ seconds (3.75 minutes)
- Juno (60s): $t \approx 180$ seconds (3.00 minutes)

This 20% latency reduction provides material improvement to user experience, particularly for point-of-sale applications where confirmation speed is critical.

4 Difficulty Retargeting Analysis

4.1 The Variance Problem

Proof-of-work difficulty must adjust dynamically to maintain target block times as network hashrate fluctuates. However, difficulty adjustments based on small samples exhibit high variance, creating several problems. Block time unpredictability degrades user experience. Emission irregularity complicates economic analysis. High variance enables gaming through strategic hashrate allocation [16].

The difficulty adjustment mechanism estimates true hashrate from observed block times over a window of N blocks. Due to the stochastic nature of proof-of-work, this estimate contains sampling error. The coefficient of variation (relative standard deviation) for the difficulty estimate is:

$$\text{RSD} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \tag{6}$$

This relationship follows from the central limit theorem and the Poisson nature of block arrival [17]. The variance decreases with the square root of sample size, meaning that doubling the window size reduces RSD by only approximately 29%.

4.2 Zcash vs Juno Retargeting Windows

Zcash implements difficulty adjustment over a 17-block window, representing approximately 21.25 minutes of network history. The resulting RSD is:

$$\text{RSD}_{\text{Zcash}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{17}} \approx 0.2425 = 24.25\% \tag{7}$$

This high variance manifests as substantial block time unpredictability. Individual difficulty epochs may experience block times ranging from 57 seconds to 98 seconds (±30% of target) purely due to statistical noise.

Juno extends the adjustment window to 100 blocks, representing approximately 100 minutes (1.67 hours) of history. The corresponding RSD is:

$$\text{RSD}_{\text{Juno}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{100}} = 0.10 = 10.0\% \tag{8}$$

The variance reduction factor V_r comparing Juno to Zcash is:

$$V_r = 1 - \frac{\text{RSD}_{\text{Juno}}}{\text{RSD}_{\text{Zcash}}} = 1 - \frac{0.10}{0.2425} \approx 0.588 \tag{9}$$

This represents a **58.8% reduction in difficulty variance**, substantially improving block time predictability and emission regularity.



Figure 2: Relative standard deviation (RSD) as a function of retargeting window size, following the $1/\sqrt{N}$ relationship. Zcash's 17-block window yields 24.3% RSD, while Juno's 100-block window achieves 10.0% RSD, representing 58.8% variance reduction.

4.3 Responsiveness vs Stability Trade-offs

Extended adjustment windows reduce variance but potentially decrease responsiveness to genuine hashrate changes. We must verify that 100 blocks provides sufficient responsiveness. Consider a sudden hashrate change by factor k (e.g., $k = 2$ for doubling, $k = 0.5$ for halving). The system converges to correct difficulty over W adjustment periods where:

$$W \approx \frac{-\ln(\epsilon)}{\ln(k)} \tag{10}$$

where ϵ is the acceptable remaining error. For 95% convergence ($\epsilon = 0.05$) and $k = 2$:

$$W \approx \frac{-\ln(0.05)}{\ln(2)} \approx 4.32 \text{ periods} \tag{11}$$

For Juno's 100-block (100-minute) windows, this represents approximately 7.2 hours to near-complete adjustment. This is substantially faster than Bitcoin's 2-week adjustment period while providing dramatically better stability than Zcash's noisy 21-minute window.

5 Emission Schedule and Monetary Policy

5.1 Design Objectives

The emission schedule determines the rate at which new coins enter circulation, critically impacting both security incentives and economic dynamics. Our design objectives are:

First, ensure fair launch without premine or founders' reward. Many cryptocurrencies allocate significant supply to developers or early investors, creating information asymmetries and centralized control [18]. We reject this approach entirely.

Second, enable gradual network bootstrapping. Immediate full emission creates flash-mining opportunities where large operations can acquire disproportionate supply before organic participation develops [19].

Third, provide long-term predictability through alignment with Bitcoin's proven 4-year halving cycle and 21 million coin supply cap. This creates familiar economic parameters for cryptocurrency participants while ensuring mining incentives remain sustainable over multi-decade timescales.

Fourth, maintain security incentives through gradual transition from inflation to transaction fees as the primary mining reward, following Bitcoin's successful model.

5.2 Five-Phase Emission Structure

Our emission schedule comprises five distinct phases designed to achieve these objectives while maintaining approximately 21 million coin maximum supply with 100% allocation to miners and zero developer tax.

5.2.1 Genesis Block (Block 0)

The genesis block (block 0) has zero emission, providing a clean initialization point for the network. All emission begins with block 1.

5.2.2 Slow Start (Blocks 1-20,000)

Rather than beginning with full emission, we implement a linear slow start where block rewards increase gradually from 0.25 JUNO to 12.5 JUNO over 20,000 blocks. This prevents flash mining by large operations while allowing the network to bootstrap organically. The subsidy function $S(h)$ for height h in this phase is:

$$S(h) = 0.25 + (h - 1) \times \frac{12.25}{19999} \tag{12}$$

where h ranges from 1 to 20,000. This linear ramp provides smooth, predictable growth in mining rewards. Total Slow Start emission is approximately 127,500 JUNO over 13.9 days. The gradual increase prevents flash mining while encouraging early miner adoption.

5.2.3 Plateau (Blocks 20,001-120,000)

A sustained period of constant 12.5 JUNO emission establishes stable mining economics during early network growth. Duration is approximately 69.4 days, sufficient for initial ecosystem development, exchange integration, and community formation. Total Plateau emission is 1,250,000 JUNO.

5.2.4 Initial Halving (Blocks 120,001-1,171,200)

Following initial network establishment, the emission reduces to 6.25 JUNO per block for approximately 2 years. This extended period at half the plateau rate provides stable economics while the network matures and transaction volume develops. Total Initial Halving emission is exactly 6,570,000 JUNO (1,051,200 blocks $\times$ 6.25 JUNO).

5.2.5 Standard 4-Year Halvings (Blocks 1,171,201+)

The long-term emission follows Bitcoin's proven halving model with 4-year intervals (2,102,400 blocks). The subsidy function for height h in this phase is:

$$S(h) = 3.125 \times 2^{-\lfloor (h-1171201)/2102400 \rfloor} \tag{13}$$

where the initial subsidy is 3.125 JUNO and the halving interval is 2,102,400 blocks (exactly 4 years at 60-second block time). The halvings proceed as follows:

- Epoch 0 (blocks 1,171,201-3,273,599): 3.125 JUNO per block
- Epoch 1 (blocks 3,273,600-5,375,999): 1.5625 JUNO per block
- Epoch 2 (blocks 5,376,002-7,478,401): 0.78125 JUNO per block
- Epoch 3 (blocks 7,478,402-9,580,801): 0.390625 JUNO per block
- Epoch 4 (blocks 9,580,802-11,683,201): 0.1953125 JUNO per block
- Epoch 5 (blocks 11,683,202-13,785,601): 0.09765625 JUNO per block
- Epoch 6 (blocks 13,785,602-15,888,001): 0.048828125 JUNO per block
- Epoch 7 (blocks 15,888,002-16,508,927): 0.024414063 JUNO per block

This aligns Juno's monetary policy with Bitcoin's established 4-year cycle, providing predictable economics familiar to cryptocurrency participants.

5.3 Precise Supply Cap Enforcement

Unlike Bitcoin's asymptotic approach to 21 million, Juno implements a hard supply cap at block 16,508,927, ensuring the maximum supply reaches approximately 21 million JUNO. This deterministic cap eliminates uncertainty about long-term monetary inflation and provides absolute supply guarantee.

The maximum supply M can be calculated as:

$$M = M_{\text{slow}} + M_{\text{plateau}} + M_{\text{initial}} + M_{\text{halvings}} \tag{14}$$

where:

- $M_{\text{slow}} = 127,500$ JUNO (Slow Start linear ramp)
- $M_{\text{plateau}} = 1,250,000$ JUNO (Plateau at 12.5 JUNO)
- $M_{\text{initial}} = 6,570,000$ JUNO (Initial Halving at 6.25 JUNO)
- $M_{\text{halvings}} \approx 13,052,500$ JUNO (Standard halvings to block 16,508,927)

The standard halving emission represents a geometric series. However, the hard cap at block 16,508,927 ensures total supply reaches approximately:

$$M \approx 21,000,000 \text{ JUNO} \tag{15}$$

The final block with non-zero reward occurs at height 16,508,927 (approximately 31.4 years from genesis). After this block, emission ceases entirely and miners are compensated exclusively through transaction fees, following Bitcoin's long-term security model.

5.4 Cumulative Coin Issuance

The total supply $M(t)$ at time t represents the cumulative emission across all phases. Figure 3 illustrates both the theoretical smooth curve and the actual stepped emission schedule.



Figure 3: Cumulative coin issuance over time. The smooth curve shows the theoretical emission model, while the stepped line represents actual block-by-block accumulation. The five emission phases are clearly visible: Slow Start linear ramp (blocks 1-20,000), Plateau (blocks 20,001-120,000), Initial Halving (blocks 120,001-1,171,200), and Standard 4-Year Halvings (blocks 1,171,201+). Maximum supply is capped at approximately 21 million JUNO at block 16,508,927.

This visualization demonstrates the protocol's controlled supply expansion aligned with Bitcoin's proven monetary model. The linear slow start prevents flash mining, the plateau period establishes stable early economics, the initial halving provides an extended maturation period, and the 4-year halving schedule ensures disciplined long-term approach to approximately 21 million JUNO maximum supply. Critically, 100% of all emission goes to miners with zero developer tax or founders' reward.

5.5 Bitcoin Alignment Rationale

The decision to target 21 million coin supply with 4-year halvings represents explicit alignment with Bitcoin's proven monetary policy. This alignment provides several advantages:

Established Economic Model: Bitcoin's 4-year halving cycle has demonstrated stable mining economics over 15+ years, providing empirical validation of the approach. Miners understand the incentive structure and can make informed capital allocation decisions.

Market Familiarity: Cryptocurrency participants are deeply familiar with 21M supply caps and 4-year cycles. This reduces explanation overhead and enables immediate economic understanding without requiring novel mental models.

Halving Event Coordination: Synchronizing major supply events on 4-year cycles creates predictable periods of heightened attention and price discovery, following the established pattern observed across multiple Bitcoin halvings.

Fee Market Development: Bitcoin's successful transition from inflation-funded to fee-funded security over 4-year intervals provides a proven template for long-term sustainability. The 4-year cycle allows adequate time for transaction demand and fee markets to develop between halvings.

We deviate from Bitcoin only where necessary to achieve our core privacy and accessibility objectives, preserving the proven monetary framework that has sustained the largest cryptocurrency network.

6 Privacy Architecture

6.1 The Insufficient Nature of Optional Privacy

Zcash introduced groundbreaking zero-knowledge proof technology enabling transaction privacy without trusted setup through the Halo 2 proof system [7]. However, privacy remained optional, with users choosing between transparent and shielded addresses. This design decision, while intended to ease adoption and maintain regulatory flexibility, has proven fundamentally insufficient.

Empirical adoption data reveals the failure of optional privacy. As of October 2025, approximately 27% of Zcash's circulating supply resides in shielded pools (approximately 4.5 million ZEC), though this represents improvement from earlier single-digit percentages [5]. Despite years of availability and significant protocol improvements, the majority of ZEC remains transparent, with most transactions exposing sender, receiver, and amount information to public analysis. This creates a privacy-hostile equilibrium where shielded transactions remain the exception rather than the norm, failing to provide the universal privacy necessary for true fungibility.

The security implications are severe. Privacy strength scales superlinearly with anonymity set size [20]. When only 27% of supply is shielded, the effective anonymity set remains substantially limited. Statistical analysis of timing patterns, amount distributions, and network-level metadata can potentially deanonymize transactions even within the shielded pool [21]. Optional privacy creates a tragedy of the commons where individual choices to use transparent transactions degrade privacy for all users.

6.2 Mandatory Shielding Architecture

Juno eliminates this problem through architectural constraint: all circulating value must exist in the Orchard shielded pool. No transparent addresses exist for coins in circulation. This design decision maximizes the anonymity set to include all network activity, providing optimal privacy guarantees.

The Orchard shielded pool, introduced in Zcash's NU5 upgrade, employs the Halo 2 proving system [7]. Unlike earlier Zcash implementations requiring trusted setup ceremonies, Halo 2 achieves zero-knowledge proofs without trusted parameters through recursive proof composition. The system provides:

Transaction Confidentiality: All transaction elements are cryptographically hidden including sender address, recipient address, and transferred amount. Each shielded address generates unlimited receiving addresses through diversification, preventing address reuse analysis.

Cryptographic Integrity: Zero-knowledge proofs ensure that shielded transactions satisfy balance requirements (inputs equal outputs) without revealing amounts. Proofs verify that:

$$\sum \text{inputs} - \sum \text{outputs} = 0 \tag{16}$$

where individual values remain encrypted. The proving system guarantees computational soundness with negligible error probability [7].

Efficient Performance: Modern Orchard implementation achieves proof generation in 2-5 seconds on commodity hardware with proof verification under 100 milliseconds. Proof size is constant at approximately 2.5 KB regardless of transaction complexity [22].

6.3 Network Effects of Mandatory Privacy

Mandatory shielding creates positive network effects that strengthen with adoption. The anonymity set size A determines privacy strength through the formula:

$$\text{Privacy} = \log_2(A) \tag{17}$$

With universal shielding, A equals total transaction volume. Compare this to optional privacy where A equals only shielded transaction volume. For Zcash's 27% shielded adoption, mandatory shielding provides:

$$\text{Privacy}_{\text{gain}} = \log_2(A_{\text{total}}) - \log_2(0.27 \times A_{\text{total}}) = \log_2(1/0.27) \approx 1.89 \text{ bits} \tag{18}$$

This represents a substantial improvement in privacy strength purely through architectural requirement, with the anonymity set nearly 4× larger under universal shielding.

Moreover, mandatory privacy eliminates the stigma associated with privacy-preserving transactions. When all transactions are private, none are suspicious. This removes regulatory and social pressure that creates adverse selection in optional privacy systems [23].

6.4 Fungibility Implications

Fungibility requires that all units of currency are interchangeable and equivalent. Bitcoin's transparency undermines fungibility by creating coin histories that enable discrimination. Coins involved in illicit activity, sanctioned addresses, or darknet markets may be rejected by exchanges or merchants, creating a two-tier monetary system where some coins are "more equal" than others [24].

Mandatory shielding restores perfect fungibility. Without transaction histories, all coins are cryptographically indistinguishable. Transaction graph analysis cannot trace coin provenance through the shielded pool. Addresses cannot be blacklisted since addresses are not publicly observable. Merchants cannot charge different prices based on payment history since no history is visible. The result is a monetary system where units maintain consistent value regardless of origin, a fundamental property of sound money.

7 Supply Auditability and Fee Market Design

7.1 The Orchard Value Balance Mechanism

Orchard shielded transactions encrypt sender addresses, recipient addresses, and transferred amounts using zero-knowledge proofs. However, the protocol includes a crucial public field: `valueBalance`, which represents the net value flowing into or out of the shielded pool in each transaction [22].

The `valueBalance` field serves as the interface between the shielded Orchard pool and the mining reward system:

$$\texttt{valueBalance} = \text{Value}_{\text{leaving pool}} - \text{Value}_{\text{entering pool}} \tag{19}$$

For a shielded transaction paying a fee:

- Input: Encrypted note of value V_{in} (private)
- Output: Encrypted note of value V_{out} (private)
- Fee: $F = V_{\text{in}} - V_{\text{out}}$ (revealed via $\texttt{valueBalance} = +F$)

The positive `valueBalance` indicates that F units exit the shielded pool to pay the miner, making the fee amount publicly observable while keeping the input and output amounts encrypted.

7.2 Mining Reward Auditability

Mining rewards are created as visible outputs, making coin creation publicly visible and easily auditable. However, these newly minted coins cannot enter circulation until the miner performs an irreversible, one-way migration to the Orchard shielded pool. Once coins enter the Orchard pool, they can never be de-shielded back to visible form.

This architecture provides perfect supply auditability while ensuring 100% of circulating value remains private. Since minted coins have no origin, the visible output merely announces the existence of the new coin before it enters the shielded pool.

Observers can verify total supply by summing all visible coinbase outputs:

$$\text{Supply}_{\text{minted}} = \sum_{\text{all blocks}} (\text{BlockSubsidy}(h) + \sum \text{Fees}) \tag{20}$$

Any inflation bug would manifest as a discrepancy between observed minted supply and the theoretical emission curve.

7.3 Fee Market Functionality

The `valueBalance` mechanism enables a fully functional fee market despite complete address and amount encryption:

Price Discovery: Users observe pending transaction fees in the mempool through public `valueBalance` fields, enabling rational fee selection based on current network congestion.

Miner Prioritization: Miners can compare transaction fees directly from `valueBalance` values, prioritizing high-fee transactions for inclusion in blocks.

Market Coordination: The visible fee information creates standard supply-demand dynamics where users adjust fees based on observed market conditions and miners respond to economic incentives.

Critically, this reveals only the fee amounts—not the parties involved or the value transferred. For a transaction sending 99.9 JUNO with a 0.1 JUNO fee, observers see only that 0.1 JUNO exited the shielded pool as a fee. The sender, receiver, and the 99.9 JUNO amount remain cryptographically hidden.

7.4 Privacy Guarantees

The `valueBalance` mechanism provides optimal privacy-functionality balance:

What remains private:

- Sender addresses (encrypted in Orchard notes)
- Recipient addresses (encrypted in Orchard notes)
- Transaction amounts (encrypted in Orchard notes)
- Transaction graph structure (no linkability between shielded transactions)

What is necessarily public:

- Transaction fees (required for fee market coordination)
- Aggregate coinbase amounts (required for supply auditability)

This design recognizes that fee markets require information visibility for coordination, while ensuring that revealing fees does not compromise the privacy of transaction participants or amounts.

7.5 Information Leakage Analysis

We acknowledge limited information leakage through aggregate fee visibility:

Per-block fee totals reveal transaction activity levels and fee market conditions. Observers can infer:

- Network congestion from fee spikes
- Approximate transaction counts from total fee amounts
- Economic activity patterns from temporal fee trends

Individual transaction fees are visible in the mempool and in mined blocks. This enables:

- Timing correlation: High-fee urgent transactions may be temporally distinctive
- Amount hints: Fee amounts may provide weak constraints on transaction values (e.g., 0.1% fee on unknown amount)

However, this leakage does not enable:

- Sender identification (addresses encrypted)
- Receiver identification (addresses encrypted)
- Transaction amount determination (values encrypted)
- Transaction graph analysis (no linkability between shielded notes)

Mitigation strategies: Users concerned about timing correlation can employ delayed transaction broadcast, fee randomization within acceptable ranges, and transaction batching to obscure distinctive patterns.

7.6 Zcash Precedent

This design directly inherits Zcash's Orchard protocol architecture, where `valueBalance` has successfully enabled both supply auditability and functional fee markets since the Sapling upgrade [7]. The mechanism has proven robust across years of production use, demonstrating that fee visibility and transactional privacy are compatible objectives.

By mandating Orchard-only transactions, Juno maximizes the anonymity set while preserving the proven `valueBalance` mechanism for coordination and auditability.

8 Security Analysis

8.1 Double-Spending and Consensus Attacks

The fundamental security property of cryptocurrency systems is resistance to double-spending, where an attacker spends the same coins in multiple conflicting transactions. In proof-of-work systems, double-spending requires the attacker to control sufficient hashrate to reorganize the blockchain.

The security threshold is conventionally 51% of network hashrate, though successful attacks are possible with lower percentages depending on attack duration and victim confirmation requirements [25]. Let H_n denote honest network hashrate and H_a denote attacker hashrate. The probability P_{success} that an attacker can reorganize k blocks is approximately:

$$P_{\text{success}} \approx \left(\frac{H_a}{H_n}\right)^k \tag{21}$$

For standard 6-confirmation security ($k = 6$) and 40% attacker hashrate:

$$P_{\text{success}} \approx 0.4^6 \approx 0.0041 = 0.41\% \tag{22}$$

This low probability becomes economically infeasible when attack costs exceed potential gains.

8.2 RandomX Security Model

Critics of CPU-friendly proof-of-work argue that cloud computing enables low-cost attacks. We analyze this claim quantitatively. Let C_{cloud} be the cost of cloud CPU rental and $C_{\text{dedicated}}$ be the cost of dedicated hardware. If $C_{\text{cloud}} < C_{\text{dedicated}}$, attackers can mount cheaper attacks than honest miners using dedicated hardware.

However, this analysis is incomplete. The relevant comparison is not individual cost but total network security S:

$$S = 0.51 \times H_{\text{total}} \times C_{\text{cloud}} \tag{23}$$

While C_{cloud} may be low, H_{total} in CPU-mining networks can be orders of magnitude higher than ASIC networks due to broader participation. A RandomX network with 1 million CPU miners each contributing 10 KH/s achieves 10 GH/s total hashrate. Attacking this requires controlling 5.1 GH/s or approximately 510,000 high-end CPUs.

8.3 Privacy Attack Vectors

Mandatory shielding maximizes privacy strength but does not eliminate all attack vectors. Network-level observers monitoring transaction broadcast patterns might correlate shielded transactions based on timing. If transaction T appears shortly after mining reward R, observers might infer correlation even without cryptographic linkage. Transaction batching and delayed broadcast can randomize timing to mitigate this threat. Future implementations could integrate Dandelion++ [26] or similar protocols that obscure transaction origin through multi-hop forwarding.

In small anonymity sets, statistical patterns in transaction amounts might leak information through Bayesian analysis. If only 100 transactions exist and one involves a distinctive amount, analysis might narrow likely senders. However, mandatory shielding ensures large anonymity sets with thousands of daily transactions, making statistical analysis intractable. Future enhancements might include dummy outputs or amount rounding to further obscure patterns.

Internet service providers or nation-state adversaries monitoring network traffic might identify transaction creators through IP address analysis. Users should employ Tor or VPN services to obfuscate network-level metadata. Protocol-level privacy protects against blockchain analysis but cannot prevent network surveillance without additional tools.

Future quantum computers might break the elliptic curve cryptography underlying Orchard's proving system. However, quantum threats affect all elliptic curve-based cryptocurrencies industry-wide. Transition to quantum-resistant cryptography will likely occur across the ecosystem before quantum computers achieve sufficient scale. The protocol's upgrade path enables cryptographic migration if necessary.

9 Threat Model and Assumptions

We explicitly state the security assumptions underlying Juno's design and acknowledge threats that remain outside our scope.

9.1 Core Security Assumptions

We assume that more than 50% of network hashrate is controlled by honest participants who follow the protocol. This honest majority assumption is fundamental to all Nakamoto consensus systems and cannot be eliminated without abandoning proof-of-work entirely. We further assume that elliptic curve cryptography and zero-knowledge proof systems remain secure against classical computers for the foreseeable future, specifically that the discrete logarithm problem on the Pallas and Vesta curves used in Halo 2 remains computationally intractable.

Our analysis depends on network propagation delays remaining under 4 seconds for 95% of blocks under normal operating conditions, as our orphan rate calculations rely on this assumption holding as the network scales. We also assume miners act rationally to maximize profit over extended time horizons, meaning that short-term attacks damaging network value are economically irrational for miners with significant invested capital.

9.2 Acknowledged Threats Outside Scope

We do not claim security against nation-state adversaries with effectively unlimited resources who can acquire arbitrary amounts of computing power or compel cloud providers to cooperate with attacks. Such adversaries can potentially attack any cryptocurrency system, and defending against unlimited resources falls outside the scope of our security model.

Future quantum computers may break elliptic curve cryptography, but this threat affects all ECC-based cryptocurrencies industry-wide. Migration paths to post-quantum cryptography exist and will likely be implemented across the ecosystem before quantum computers achieve sufficient scale. Similarly, we do not protect against physical attacks on mining facilities, internet infrastructure, or power grids, though geographic distribution of mining mitigates but does not eliminate these risks.

Legal and regulatory prohibition represents another threat outside our technical scope. We cannot prevent governments from banning cryptocurrency mining or usage through legal mechanisms. Such attacks fall outside the technical domain and must be addressed through legal and political means. Finally, like all software systems, implementation bugs may create security vulnerabilities. While we will employ rigorous testing and security audits, we cannot guarantee bug-free implementation.

9.3 Regulatory Considerations for Privacy Architecture

The mandatory privacy architecture presents unique regulatory challenges that merit explicit discussion. Several jurisdictions have taken restrictive positions on privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies. Japan delisted Monero, Zcash, and Dash from regulated exchanges in 2018. South Korea maintains similar restrictions. The European Union's Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR) proposals include provisions that may restrict privacy coin services.

We acknowledge that mandatory privacy may limit adoption in jurisdictions requiring transaction visibility for compliance purposes. This represents a conscious design choice prioritizing privacy as a fundamental right over regulatory convenience. Users in restrictive jurisdictions may need to rely on peer-to-peer exchange mechanisms or decentralized trading protocols rather than centralized exchanges.

Future protocol development may explore view key systems that enable selective disclosure for regulatory compliance without undermining general privacy. Such systems would allow users to voluntarily prove transaction details to specific parties (such as auditors or regulators) while maintaining privacy from general observers. However, implementing view keys without creating surveillance backdoors requires careful cryptographic design and is left to future work.

10 Economic Analysis

10.1 Security Budget and Fee Transition

Long-term blockchain security depends on miner compensation. Initially, block rewards provide this compensation, but as emission decreases through halvings, transaction fees must eventually sustain mining. The security budget $B(t)$ at time t is:

$$B(t) = S(t) + F(t) \tag{24}$$

where $S(t)$ is block reward and $F(t)$ is total transaction fees. As $S(t) \to 0$ through halvings, $F(t)$ must increase to maintain security.

Security budget composition over time shows gradual transition from block rewards to transaction fees. The 4-year halving schedule, aligned with Bitcoin's proven model, provides measured fee market development over multi-decade timescales. Bitcoin's successful operation through multiple halvings demonstrates the viability of this approach, with fee revenue gradually increasing to compensate for declining block rewards.

The extended 4-year intervals provide sufficient time for organic transaction demand growth and fee market maturation between halvings. This measured pace reduces shock to mining economics compared to more aggressive halving schedules, allowing miners to adapt infrastructure and business models incrementally.

10.2 Fair Launch Economics

Zero premine and zero founders' reward create a purely market-based distribution. This eliminates several problematic dynamics present in pre-allocated cryptocurrencies. Pre-allocated coins create classes of participants with different information and incentives, where founders may have strong incentives to maximize short-term token value for exit opportunities. Additionally, founders' rewards create centralized token treasuries that wield disproportionate influence over markets and governance. From a regulatory perspective, pre-allocated tokens may be considered securities under the Howey test [27], subjecting projects to securities regulation. Fair launch through pure proof-of-work mining eliminates these concerns, as all participants acquire coins through the same mechanism of mining or market purchase, creating aligned long-term incentives.

10.3 Mining Profitability Analysis

Mining profitability P for a participant is:

$$P = R \times \text{Price} - C \tag{25}$$

where R is expected daily coin rewards, Price is market price per coin, and C is daily operating cost (electricity, hardware amortization). For CPU mining, hardware costs are low since participants can repurpose existing computers. The primary cost is electricity.

Let $H_{\text{participant}}$ be participant hashrate, H_{network} be total network hashrate, S_{daily} be daily coin emission, and E be cost per kWh. Daily profitability becomes:

$$P = \frac{H_{\text{participant}}}{H_{\text{network}}} \times S_{\text{daily}} \times \text{Price} - (\text{Power} \times 24 \times E) \tag{26}$$

where Power is kilowatt consumption. Modern CPUs mining RandomX consume approximately 100-200W, yielding daily electricity costs of \$0.50-\$1.00 at typical \$0.10/kWh rates.

This low operating cost enables profitable mining even for hobbyists, promoting decentralization. Participants value network participation beyond pure profit maximization, contributing hashrate for ideological reasons or portfolio allocation.

10.4 Mining Centralization Pressures

Despite RandomX's ASIC resistance, economic forces continue to exert centralization pressures on mining participation. Large operations benefit from economies of scale including bulk electricity rates negotiated with utilities, optimized cooling and infrastructure that reduces per-unit costs, and automated management systems that eliminate labor overhead. Geographic concentration emerges naturally as mining operations locate in regions with cheap electricity such as Iceland, Quebec, and Kazakhstan, creating potential systemic risks from regional regulatory

changes or infrastructure disruptions. Furthermore, even with distributed individual miners, mining pools create coordination points where hashrate aggregates, potentially enabling censorship or coordination attacks despite the underlying hardware remaining distributed. We acknowledge these persistent centralization risks but argue that CPU-friendly mining lowers barriers to entry sufficiently to enable meaningful hobbyist participation that would be completely excluded from ASIC-dominated networks. The goal is not to eliminate all centralization pressures—which may be impossible in any economic system—but to reduce them to manageable levels where community oversight and distributed participation can provide effective counterbalances.

11 Comparative Analysis

11.1 Comparison to Bitcoin

Bitcoin represents the foundational cryptocurrency against which all alternatives must be measured. Table 1 summarizes key differences.

Table 1: Comparison: Juno vs Bitcoin

Aspect	**Bitcoin**	**Juno**
Privacy	Transparent	Mandatory shielding
Mining	ASIC-dominated	CPU-friendly (RandomX)
Block time	10 minutes	60 seconds
Difficulty adjust	2016 blocks	100 blocks
Max supply	21 million BTC	21 million JUNO
Halving interval	4 years	4 years
Founders' reward	None	None
Key Difference	Juno adds mandatory privacy and accessibility while preserving Bitcoin's proven monetary policy	

11.2 Comparison to Zcash

Zcash represents the immediate ancestor of Juno's privacy technology. Table 2 highlights critical distinctions.

Table 2: Comparison: Juno vs Zcash

Aspect	**Zcash**	**Juno**
Privacy	Optional	Mandatory
Shielded adoption	∼27%	100%
Mining	Equihash (ASIC)	RandomX (CPU)
Block time	75 seconds	60 seconds
Difficulty adjust	17 blocks	100 blocks
Max supply	21 million ZEC	21 million JUNO
Halving interval	4 years	4 years
Founders' reward	20%	0%
Key Difference	Juno enforces privacy architecturally and eliminates founders' reward, maximizing anonymity set and fair distribution	

11.3 Comparison to Monero

Monero pioneered mandatory privacy in cryptocurrency systems and employs the same RandomX mining algorithm. Table 3 compares the approaches.

Table 3: Comparison: Juno vs Monero

Aspect	**Monero**	**Juno**
Privacy tech	RingCT + Stealth	Orchard (Halo 2)
Trusted setup	None	None
Mining	RandomX	RandomX
Block time	120 seconds	60 seconds
Difficulty adjust	∼720 blocks	100 blocks
Max supply	Infinite (tail emission)	21 million JUNO (hard cap)
Tail emission	0.6 XMR/block	None
Key Difference	Juno offers stronger privacy mathematics, auditable supply, and Bitcoin-aligned monetary policy	

12 Conclusion

We have presented Juno Cash, a cryptocurrency protocol designed to fulfill the original vision of peer-to-peer electronic cash through mandatory privacy, egalitarian mining, and optimized stability. Our principal contributions address fundamental limitations in existing systems while preserving Bitcoin's proven monetary framework.

Our mandatory privacy architecture maximizes anonymity sets by eliminating transparent addresses for user transactions. All value transfer occurs through Zcash's Orchard shielded pool, providing cryptographic confidentiality for sender, receiver, and amount while maintaining supply auditability and functional fee markets through the `valueBalance` mechanism. This design choice rejects the failed experiment of optional privacy, recognizing that privacy as an opt-in feature creates adverse selection and degrades security for all participants.

Through RandomX, we implement egalitarian proof-of-work that resists ASIC implementation, enabling broad participation using commodity CPU hardware. While this may reduce the absolute cost of attack relative to ASIC-dominated networks, it dramatically improves decentralization through lower barriers to entry, greater geographic distribution, and enhanced censorship resistance. We prioritize these decentralization benefits over pure cost-of-attack maximization, recognizing that real-world threats to cryptocurrency systems often involve coordination and coercion rather than pure economic attacks.

Our optimized consensus parameters balance confirmation speed with network stability. The 60-second block time provides 20% faster confirmation than Zcash while maintaining acceptable orphan rates below 7% even under adverse propagation conditions. The 100-block difficulty adjustment window reduces variance by 58.8% relative to Zcash's 17-block window, improving block time predictability and emission regularity while maintaining sufficient responsiveness to genuine hashrate changes.

The emission schedule explicitly aligns with Bitcoin's proven monetary policy: 21 million coin maximum supply with 4-year halving intervals. This alignment provides market familiarity, predictable economics, and a template for sustainable fee market development. Fair launch ensures equitable distribution through zero premine and zero founders' reward. The multi-phase ramp-up prevents flash mining while enabling gradual network bootstrapping, culminating in Bitcoin's established 4-year halving cycle.

12.1 Limitations and Future Work

No protocol is without limitations. Juno Cash accepts several conscious trade-offs in pursuit of its design objectives.

Shielded transactions require more computation than transparent alternatives. While modern hardware handles this efficiently, users with severely constrained resources may experience friction. Future optimizations may further reduce this overhead through improved proof systems or cryptographic techniques. The CPU-friendly mining approach may have lower absolute attack cost than ASIC-dominated alternatives, though this risk is mitigated by broader decentralization, community vigilance, and the practical difficulty of covertly acquiring sufficient cloud computing resources for sustained attacks.

Mandatory privacy may face regulatory challenges in jurisdictions that require transaction visibility for compliance purposes. While we believe privacy is a fundamental right, regulatory acceptance remains uncertain. Future research might explore view key systems that enable selective disclosure for compliance without undermining general privacy. The development of a robust fee market is critical to long-term security as block rewards diminish through halvings. Our 4-year halving schedule, following Bitcoin's proven model, provides gradual transition, but whether transaction fees will adequately sustain mining remains an open question for all halving-based systems.

Future work should address these limitations through continued protocol development, privacy enhancements, and economic research. Potential improvements include Dandelion++ integration for network-level privacy, recursive proof aggregation for scalability, and formal economic modeling of mining incentives over time.

12.2 Broader Implications

Juno Cash demonstrates that privacy and auditability are not mutually exclusive objectives. Through the `valueBalance` mechanism inherited from Zcash's Orchard protocol, we achieve both comprehensive transactional privacy and cryptographically verifiable supply auditing. This resolves a tension that has plagued privacy-focused cryptocurrencies and suggests that similar selective transparency approaches might benefit other blockchain applications.

Our mandatory privacy architecture challenges the prevailing assumption that privacy should be optional. Optional privacy has failed to achieve majority adoption empirically, with only 27% shielded adoption in Zcash as of October 2025 despite years of availability and significant protocol improvements. This persistent minority usage stems from network effects, regulatory pressure, and coordination problems. Mandatory privacy eliminates these obstacles, demonstrating that architectural constraints can solve coordination failures that market forces cannot.

The deliberate alignment with Bitcoin's 21 million supply and 4-year halving cycle represents recognition that successful monetary policy requires multi-decade stability and market familiarity. Rather than experimenting with novel economic parameters, we preserve Bitcoin's proven framework while innovating only where necessary to achieve privacy and accessibility objectives.

The success or failure of Juno Cash will ultimately depend not only on technical soundness but on community adoption, ecosystem development, and regulatory evolution. However, we believe the core design principles—privacy by default, accessibility through CPU mining, stability through optimized parameters, and Bitcoin-aligned monetary policy—represent sound engineering choices that address real problems in existing cryptocurrency systems.

In an era of increasing financial surveillance, censorship, and centralized control, the need for privacy-preserving, censorship-resistant electronic cash has never been greater. Juno Cash offers one approach to meeting this need through careful synthesis of proven technologies and rigorous parameter optimization. We present this work to the cryptocurrency community for evaluation, criticism, and potential improvement.

References

[1] S. Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," 2008.

[2] F. Reid and M. Harrigan, "An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System," in *Security and Privacy in Social Networks*, Springer, 2013, pp. 197–223.

[3] N. Van Saberhagen, "CryptoNote v 2.0," 2013.

[4] E. B. Sasson et al., "Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin," in *2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2014, pp. 459–474.

[5] The Block, "Zcash Shielded Supply," https://www.theblock.co/data/on-chain-metrics/comparison-bitcoin-ethereum-solana/zcash-shielded-supply, October 2025.

[6] A. Gervais et al., "Is Bitcoin a Decentralized Currency?" *IEEE Security & Privacy*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 54–60, 2014.

[7] S. Bowe, J. Grigg, and D. Hopwood, "Halo: Recursive Proof Composition without a Trusted Setup," *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2019.

[8] The Monero Project, "RandomX: CPU-friendly Proof-of-Work," 2019.

[9] C. Dwork and M. Naor, "Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail," in *Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO'92*, Springer, 1992, pp. 139–147.

[10] M. B. Taylor, "The Evolution of Bitcoin Hardware," *Computer*, vol. 50, no. 9, pp. 58–66, 2017.

[11] A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich, "Equihash: Asymmetric Proof-of-Work Based on the Generalized Birthday Problem," *Ledger*, vol. 2, pp. 1–30, 2016.

[12] D. Vorick, "The State of Cryptocurrency Mining," Sia Tech Blog, 2018.

[13] J. Bonneau et al., "SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies," in *2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2015, pp. 104–121.

[14] C. Decker and R. Wattenhofer, "Information Propagation in the Bitcoin Network," in *IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings*, 2013, pp. 1–10.

[15] K. Croman et al., "On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains," in *International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security*, Springer, 2016, pp. 106–125.

[16] L. Bahack, "Theoretical Bitcoin Attacks with Less than Half of the Computational Power (draft)," *arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.7013*, 2013.

[17] M. Rosenfeld, "Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems," *arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.4980*, 2011.

[18] G. Fanti et al., "Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies," in *International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security*, Springer, 2019, pp. 42–61.

[19] M. Carlsten et al., "On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward," in *Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, 2016, pp. 154–167.

[20] A. Serjantov and G. Danezis, "Towards an Information Theoretic Metric for Anonymity," in *International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies*, Springer, 2002, pp. 41–53.

[21] G. Kappos et al., "An Empirical Analysis of Anonymity in Zcash," in *27th USENIX Security Symposium*, 2018, pp. 463–477.

[22] D. Hopwood et al., "Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2022.3.8," 2022.

[23] M. Möser, R. Böhme, and D. Breuker, "An Inquiry into Money Laundering Tools in the Bitcoin Ecosystem," in *2013 APWG eCrime Researchers Summit*, IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–14.

[24] A. Baumann, B. Fabian, and M. Lischke, "Exploring the Bitcoin Network," in *WEBIST*, vol. 1, 2014, pp. 369–374.

[25] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer, "Majority is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable," in *International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security*, Springer, 2014, pp. 436–454.

[26] G. Fanti et al., "Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees," *Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1–35, 2018.

[27] A. Hinkes, "The SEC's Framework for 'Investment Contract' Analysis of Digital Assets," *Duke Law & Technology Review*, vol. 18, pp. 84–114, 2019.

Acknowledgments

This work builds upon the foundational contributions of numerous researchers and developers in the cryptocurrency space. We acknowledge the Bitcoin Core developers for establishing decentralized money, the Zcash team for pioneering zero-knowledge privacy technology, the Monero community for demonstrating the importance of mandatory privacy, and the RandomX developers for creating egalitarian proof-of-work. This research stands on their shoulders.